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THE JOINT TENANCY MAKES A COMEBACK
IN NORTH CAROLINA
JOHN V. ORTH*
The 1989-90 North Carolina General Assembly amended North
CarolinaGeneral.Statutes section 41-2 to allow the creation of a right of
survivorship injoint tenancy, a right that had been abolishedin the state
more than two hundredyears ago. After a briefexamination of the history of joint tenancy in North Carolina,Professor John Orth addresses
two questions that the new legislation hasprovoked. The first, regarding
the degree of precision necessary in expressly providing for a right of
survivorship, may be solved through professionalprudence and sympatheticjudicialconstruction. The second concerns the revival of the common-law requirement of the four unities necessary to the creation of a
joint tenancy with right ofsurvivorship. ProfessorOrth concludes by proposing remedial legislation to eliminate this second dilemma raised by
the new statute
In its 1989-90 legislative session the General Assembly of North Carolina
restored the right of survivorship to the ancient concurrent estate of joint tenancy, a right that had been abolished by legislation more than two centuries ago.
The new statute, effective January 1, 1991, permits the creation of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship "if the instrument creating the joint tenancy
expressly provides for a right of survivorship." l Other provisions restate the
* Professor of Law , University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A.B. 1969, Oberlin College;
J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Harvard University.
1. Act of July 12, 1990, ch. 891, § 1, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws-.
G.S. 41-2 reads as rewritten:
"§ 41-2. SURvIVORSHIP IN JOINT TENANCY *AesafiHE0 DEFINED; PROVISO AS TO
PARTNERSHIP.

I Except as otherwise provided herein, in all estates, real or personal, held in joint tenancy, the part or share of any tenant dying shall not descend or go to the surviving tenant,

but shall descend or be vested in the heirs, executors, or administrators, respectively, of the
tenant so dying, in the same manner as estates held by tenancy in common: Provided, that
estates held in joint tenancy for the purpose of carrying on and promoting trade and commerce, or any useful work or manufacture, established and pursued with a view of profit to
the parties therein concerned, are vested in the surviving partner, in order to enable him to
settle and adjust the partnership business, or pay off the debts which may have been contracted in pursuit of the joint business; but as soon as the same is effected, the survivor shall
account with, and pay, and deliver to the heirs, executors and administrators respectively
of such deceased partner all such part, share, and sums of money as he may be entitled to
by virtue of the original agreement, if any, or according to his share or part in the joint
concern, in the same manner as partnership stock is usually settled between joint
merchants and the representatives of their deceased partners. Nothing in this section prevents the creation of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship in real or personal property
if the instrument creating the joint tenancy expressly provides tor a right of survivorship,
and no other document shall be necessary to establish said right of survivorship. Upon
conveyance to a third party by less than all of three or more joint tenants holding property
in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, a tenancy m common is created among the third
party and the remaining joint tenants, who remain joint tenants with right of survivorship
as between themselves. Upon conveyance to a third party by one of two joint tenants
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common law concerning the effect of a conveyance by one joint tenant. If there
are three or more joint tenants, a conveyance by one severs the estate as to the
conveyed interest, making the conveyee a tenant in common with the others,
who remain joint tenants as between themselves. 2 If there are two joint tenants,
a conveyance by one severs the estate altogether, leaving the concurrent owners
as tenants in common. Left unanswered by the new statute is the question
whether the common law requirement of "four unities"-time, title, interest,
and possession-remains essential for the creation of the joint tenancy with right
3
of survivorship in North Carolina.

This Article will briefly survey the history of joint tenancy in North Carolina, noting the means by which something like a right of survivorship was recognized prior to the present statute. It will then examine the new statute and
raise two questions about its application, one which may be answered by sympathetic judicial construction, the other which probably will require corrective legislation. In both cases the Article will describe the means by which careful
practitioners can avoid creating uncertainties. Finally, the Article will propose
further legislation that would eliminate the one substantial question raised by
the new statute.
A. History of Joint Tenancy in North Carolina
By virtue of colonial legislation and practice North Carolina courts applied
the common law as the rule of decision. 4 At common law any conveyance or
devise to two unmarried persons created a joint tenancy, an estate conceptualized as one held by the joint tenants collectively rather than by each joint tenant
individually.5 The existence of the joint tenancy was marked by the presence of
the time-hallowed "four unities" of time, title, interest, and possession: the joint
tenants had to take their estate at the same time, trace it to the same source of
title (deed or will), hold the same interest-no unequal shares were allowedand share the same undivided possession. Without the four unities a joint tenancy could not be created, and the termination of any one of them severed the
joint tenancy. Persons holding property concurrently but without the four uniholding property in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, a tenancy in common is created between the third party and the remaining joint tenant."
2. Although the statute refers to a conveyance "to a third party," the common law reached

the same result even when the conveyee was one of the original joint tenants. 2 W. BLACKSTONE,

186 (1766); E. COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 193a (1628); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.2 (A. Casner ed. 1952). The only conveyance that would have failed to sever a joint tenancy at common law was one a joint tenant made
as grantor to the same joint tenant as grantee. Because the statute does not address either situation,
it can only be assumed that the common law results would still obtain.
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

3. The common law did not, strictly speaking, require the four unities for the creation of a

joint tenancy; instead, the four unities defined the estate of joint tenancy. Without them, a joint

tenancy could not come into being, or remain in existence: in other words, the four unities had to be
present at the creation of the estate of joint tenancy, and the failure of any unity terminated or
severed the estate.
4. Act of 1715, ch. 31, § VI, reprinted in 23 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 38,
39 (W. Clark ed. 1904) [hereinafter STATE RECORDS] (present version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1

(1986)).
5. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 182.
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ties held a tenancy in common, an estate in which each tenant held undivided
shares.
The most important consequence of holding property in joint tenancy
rather than in tenancy in common appeared at the death of one of the concurrent owners. In estates held in joint tenancy the interest of a deceased joint
tenant enured to the benefit of the survivor, while in tenancies in common the
share of the deceased tenant passed by devise or intestacy. This characteristic of
the joint tenancy, which marked it off from the tenancy in common, was known
as the "right of survivorship."
In 1784 the right of survivorship was abolished in North Carolina 6 as part
of a wide-ranging reform of property law that included an end to primogeniture
and entailed estates. 7 The sole expression of legislative intention with respect to
the change in concurrent estates appears in the preamble to the relevant section
of the statute: "in real and personal estate held in join-tenancy the benefit of
survivorship is a manifest injustice to the families of such as may happen to die
first." 8 The injustice referred to is presumably that of reasonable expectations
defeated; widows, 9 heirs, or devisees of deceased owners discovering that they
take no share in the concurrent estate because it was held, unbeknownst to them
and perhaps even to the co-owners, in joint tenancy. Of course, no injustice
could be discerned if all parties knew the exact nature of the tenancy and its
legal consequences.
The legislative remedy was to abolish the "benefit of survivorship." With
only a few insignificant changes in wording, the Act of 1784 has endured to the
present, its current form appearing in North Carolina General Statutes section
41-2:
In all estates, real or personal, held in joint tenancy, the part or
share of any tenant dying shall not descend or go to the surviving tenant, but shall descend or be vested in the heirs, executors, or administrators, respectively, of the tenant so dying, in the same manner as
estates held by tenancy in common. 10
The Act of 1784 did not abolish joint tenancies, but by ending the right of survivorship in inheritable estates it made them practically indistinguishable from
6. Act of 1784, ch. 22, § VI, reprintedin 24 STATE REcoRDs, supra note 4, at 574 (present
version in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1984)).
7. Act of 1784, ch. 22, § II (primogeniture), reprintedin 24 STATE REcoRDs, supranote 4, at
572-73; Id. § V (entails), reprintedin 24 STATE RECORDS, supra note 4, at 574. On the latter, see
Orth, Does the Fee Tail Exist in North Carolina?,23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 767 (1988).
8. Act of 1784, ch. 22, § VI, reprinted in 24 STATE RECORDS, supra note 4, at 574.
9. At common law widows were not heirs of their deceased husbands; they were instead entifled to dower, a life estate in one-third of all real property of which their husbands were seized
during the marriage. The Act of 1784 included a number of provisions on dower and its assignment.
Act of 1784, ch. 22, H9 VIII-X, reprinted in 24 STATE RECORDS, supra note 4, at 575-76. Dower
was not assignable out of lands held by a husband in joint tenancy but was assignable out of lands

held by him as a tenant in common.
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1984).

Earlier codifications are CONSOLIDATED STATUTES OF

NORTH CAROLINA, ch. 34, § 1735 (1919); REVISAL 1905 OF NORTH CAROLINA, ch. 33,

§

1579

(1905); THE CODE OF NORTH CAROLINA, ch. 31, § 1326 (1883); REVISED CODE OF NORTH CAROLINA,

ch. 43, § 2 (1854).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

tenancies in common.1 1 By a proviso in the original Act, also still in effect, the
right of survivorship was retained for joint tenancies held by business partnerships.' 2 Later legislation maintained the right of survivorship in joint tenancies
held by joint trustees, 13 joint mortgagees or trustees with a power of sale, 1 4 and
joint executors or administrators. 15 In addition, the manifest convenience of
joint accounts at banking institutions led to legislation facilitating such arrangements. 16 Joint tenancies with right of survivorship in shares of stock or investment securities were permitted by statute, but only when the joint owners were
husband and wife-and even then, subject to the rights of creditors of a deceased
joint tenant; the latest statute extends that permission to "any parties," regard17
less of their marital relationship.
11. The continued existence of the joint tenancy in life estates might have made some difference
in the application of the Rule in Wild's Case, although this technicality has not generally been

recognized by the courts. See Link, The Rule in Wild's Case in North Carolina,55 N.C.L. REv. 751,
793-95 (1977).
12. The proviso reads:
Provided, that estates held in joint tenancy for the purpose of carrying on and promoting
trade and commerce, or any useful work or manufacture, established and pursued with a
view of profit to the parties therein concerned, are vested in the surviving partner, in order
to enable him to settle and adjust the partnership business, or pay off the debts which may
have been contracted in pursuit of the joint business; but as soon as the same is effected, the
survivor shall account with, and pay, and deliver to the heirs, executors and administrators
respectively of such deceased partner all such part, share, and sums of money as he may be
entitled to by virtue of the original agreement, if any, or according to his share or part in
the joint concern, in the same manner as partnership stock is usually settled between joint
merchants and the representatives of their deceased partners.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1984).
13. Id. § 41-3. The statute provides:
In all cases where only a naked trust not coupled with a beneficial interest has been created
or exists, or shall be created, and the conveyance is to two or more trustees, the right to
perform the trust and make estates under the same shall be exercised by any one of such
trustees, in the event of the death of his cotrustee or cotrustees or the refusal or inability of
the cotrustee or cotrustees to perform the trust; and in cases of trusts herein named the
trustees shall hold as joint tenants, and in all respects as joint tenants held before the year
1784.
Id.
14. Id. § 45-8. The statute provides:
In all mortgages and deeds of trust of real property wherein two or more persons, as trustees or otherwise, are given power to sell the property therein conveyed or embraced, and
one or more of such persons dies, any one of the persons surviving having such power may
make sale of such property in the manner directed in such deed, and execute such assurances of title as are proper and lawful under the power so given; and the act of such person,
in pursuance of said power, shall be as valid and binding as if the same had been done by
all the persons on whom the power was conferred.
p
Id.
15. Id. § 28A-13-5. The statute provides: "Any estate or interest in property which becomes
vested in two or more personal representatives shall be held by them in joint tenancy with the incident of survivorship." Id.
16. North Carolinians are offered a choice in types of joint accounts. Compare id. § 41-2.1
(right of survivorship in bank deposits) with id. § 53-146.1 (1990) (joint accounts in banks) and id.
§ 54B-129 (1990) (joint accounts in savings and loan associations).
17. Act of July 12, 1990, ch. 891, § 2, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws-.

G.S. 41-2.2 is rewritten to read:
"§ 41-2.2. JOINT OWNERSHIP OF CORPORATE STOCK AND INVESTMENT SECURITIES.
(a) In addition to other forms of ownership, shares of corporate stock or investment securities may be owned by husba. .nd wic any parties as joint tenants with rights of
survivorship, and not as tenants in common, m te manner provided in this section.
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As we have seen, the legislative remedy abolishing the right of survivorship
was more extensive than the injustice it was meant to cure. Exceptions in commercial cases were needed from the beginning because the joint tenancy with
right of survivorship was useful, even necessary, and no injustice was to be
feared in such cases because the parties knew of, and desired, the relationship.
Inevitably cases arose outside the explicit statutory exceptions in which parties
consciously sought the benefit of survivorship for reasons of their own-perhaps
to avoid probate.1 8 Would the North Carolina courts refuse to give effect to
clearly expressed intentions in such cases?
In fact, North Carolina courts occasionally have recognized something like
rights of survivorship on grounds supposedly drawn from the law of contracts.
The reasoning was starkly stated in one case from 1895:
The Act of 1784, (Code, Sec. 1326) abolishes survivorship, where the
joint tenancy would otherwise have been created by the law, but does
not operate to prohibit persons from entering into written contracts as
to land, or verbal agreements as to personalty, such as to make the
future rights of the parties depend upon the fact of survivorship.' 9

The application of this theory is illustrated by the 1964 decision in Vettori v.
In that case a conveyance had been made to two persons "as joint ten-

Fay.20

ants" and to "the heirs and assigns of the survivor."121 After the death of one
(b) (1) A joint tenancy in shares of corporate stock or investment securities as provided by
this section shall exist when such shares or securities indicate that they are owned
with the right of survivorship, or otherwise clearly indicate an intention that upon
the death of either speme party, the interest of the decedent shall pass to the
surviving spouse.,party.
(2) Such a joint tenancy may also exist when a broker or custodian holds the shares or
securities for the joint tenants and by book entry or otherwise indicates (i)
that the
shares or securities are owned with the right of survivorship, or (ii) otherwise
clearly indicates that upon the death of either spese party, the interest of the
decedent shall pass to the surviving spese party. Mone-ym the hands of such
broker or custodian derived from the sale oT, or held for the purpose of, such
shares or securities shall be treated in the same manner as such shares or securities.
(c)Upon the death of a joint tenant his interest shall pass to the surviving joint tenant.
The interest of the deceased joint tenant, even though it has passed to the surviving
joint tenant, remains liable for the debts of the decedent in the same manner as the
personal property included in his estate, and recovery thereof shall be made from the
surviving joint tenant when the decedent's estate is insufficient to satisfy such debts.
(d)Nothing herein contained shall be construed to repeal or modify any of the provisions
of G.S. 105-2, 105-11, and 105-24, relating to the administration of the inheritance tax
laws, or any other provisions of the law relating to inheritance taxes."
18. Property lawyers should not ignore what might be called nonmaterial or psychological reasons for two unmarried persons seeking to place property in their joint names. Holding a residence,
for instance, as joint tenants with right of survivorship might represent for the parties a commitment
to a lifelong relationship and provide a sense of security. Of course, a joint tenancy affords far less
protection to such parties than a tenancy by the entirety, which is available only to married couples.
19. Taylor v. Smith, 116 N.C. 531, 535, 21 S.E. 202, 204 (1895).
20. 262 N.C. 481, 137 S.E.2d 810 (1964).
21. Id. at 482, 137 S.E.2d at 810-I1. The granting clause ran "unto the parties of the second
part their assigns as joint tenants and unto their [sic] heirs and assigns of their survivor forever,"
while the habendum clause was "unto the said parties of the second part their assigns, and the heirs
and assigns of the survivor to the only use and behoof of them and their said heirs and assigns

forever." Id.
Although the court read this grant as creating a contractual right of survivorship, it might have
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cotenant, the other brought an action against the heirs of the deceased seeking a
judgment that defendants had no interest in the property. The North Carolina
Supreme Court upheld the conclusions of the trial court "that the deed was a
written contract and that its provisions were binding upon and between the
grantees." 22 The decision may be defended as effectuating the apparent intention of the cotenants as to what should happen upon the death of the first to die,
but it must be conceded that the losing parties fell squarely within the class of
those singled out for protection in 1784: "the families of such as may happen to
23
die first."
Basing the decision in Vettori on contract raises several disturbing questions. The "contract" that supposedly conferred the right of survivorship was
contained in a conveyance by a grantor to the grantees. Normally grantors have
no interest in the form of title taken by grantees and merely follow their instructions in this regard; there is no indication that the grantor in Vettori did other-

wise. The intention that matters, then, is that of the grantees, yet there is no
evidence of any consideration passing between them; there are certainly no
words of promise in the grant. Left unanswered is whether, while both cotenants were alive, either one could have conveyed an undivided interest. In a true
joint tenancy each has the power to sever the tenancy by conveyance. It is difficult to imagine that anyone would view such a conveyance in the circumstances
of Vettori as a breach of contract. Yet if it is not viewed as such, then the right
of survivorship created by the deed must be taken to be a product of conveyance,
or the implied terms of the contract must be greatly elaborated. 24
Not only does the contract theory leave unanswered certain disturbing
questions, but it also has not been applied consistently by the courts. In the
1949 decision ofPope v. Burgess,25 a contract clearly intended to create a right of
construed it to create a joint life estate followed by alternative contingent remainders in fee simple.
Note that the words of inheritance ("and heirs") apply only to the survivor.
22. Id. at 483, 137 S.E.2d at 811.
23. Act of 1784, ch. 22, § VI, reprintedin 24 STATE RECORDS supra, note 4, at 574.
24. Had the court in Vettori read the grant to create a joint life estate followed by alternative
contingent remainders in fee simple, either cotenant could have conveyed the share of the life estate
(creating an estatepur autre vie) and-by virtue of North Carolina General Statutes § 39-6.3, making such interests alienable-the alternative contingent remainder in fee simple.
25. 230 N.C. 323, 53 S.E.2d 159 (1949), refusing to enforce the following contract:
North Carolina
Nash County
This Contract, made this December 28, 1934, by and between William R. Pope and Carter
R. Pope, Witnesseth:
That whereas, the parties hereto are the owners as tenants in common of two hundred
forty (240) acres of land, more or less, including the store house and building, the tenant
houses and all outhouses, and improvements of every kind and sort, located in Nash
County, North Carolina, described or referred to in the last Will and Testament of Thomas
S. Pope, deceased, and also in the deed executed by Thomas S. Pope and Allean Pope to
T.T. Thorne, Trustee, recorded in Book 347, at page 259, in the office of the Register of
Deeds of Nash County, and in addition thereto, are the owners as tenants in common of
two (2) acres of land situate in or near the Town of Battleboro, and being the same land
conveyed by J. R. Whitehead and wife, Mayme Whitehead, to William R. Pope and Carter
R. Pope; and whereas, the parties hereto have agreed to and with each other that it is the
desire and purpose that on the death of either one of said parties, that is William R. Pope
and Carter R. Pope, that the survivor, or one living, shall become the absolute owner in fee
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survivorship and recorded in the registry of deeds was denied effect because it

did not operate as a present conveyance! Notwithstanding the difficulties with
the contract theory, North Carolina lawyers today are using contracts purporting to create rights of survivorship, typically attached to deeds and recorded

with them. 2 6 Worries about their enforceability may have been one of the considerations that led legislators to pass the new statute. 27
B.

The New Statute on Joint Tenancy

The new statute on joint tenancy comes in the form of an addition to the
current codification of the Act of 1784; that is, the general rule adopted two
centuries ago remains in force, but a further and very broad exception to it is
created. The estate of joint tenancy in North Carolina is still without the right
of survivorship, unless "the instrument creating the joint tenancy expressly provides for a right of survivorship."' 28 The effect is very much like a reversal of the
simple of all and every part of the interest of the party hereto deceased in the foregoing

described lands, and it is further agreed that the executor, or administrator of the party
hereto so deceased, as aforesaid, shall make, execute and deliver unto the survivor a deed in
fee simple for such estate, right, title and interest as the person so deceased may have or
own at the time of his death in and to the foregoing described or referred to lands, so that
the survivor shall become the absolute owner in fee simple of the estate and interest of the
deceased party in as full and ample a manner as if the conveyance should have been made
of said lands to the said survivor. It is the purpose and intent of this conveyance that the
parties hereto, who are tenants in common of said lands, desire and intend that on the
death of one of the parties hereto that all the estate, right, title, and interest that he has in
and to the aforesaid lands shall become vested in the survivor as the owner in fee simple
thereof, just as if said survivor, whether it be William R. Pope or Carter R. Pope, had been
the owner of said lands in fee simple absolute in the first place.
The consideration for this contract is Ten Dollars ($10.00) paid by each of the contracting parties hereto to the other contracting party, and for other good and valuable
considerations passing from and to the parties to this contract.
This instrument is executed in duplicate originals on this 28th day of December 1934,
original copies hereof delivered to William R. Pope and to Carter R. Pope.
Id. at 323-26, 53 S.E.2d at 159-61.
26. In a typical example, the grantees in a deed are described as "joint tenants with right of
survivorship as agreed on per Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference." The
exhibit is described as a "joint tenancy agreement":
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the agreements contained herein and the sum
of ONE AND NO/100 ($1.00) DOLLAR, receipt and sufficiency of said consideration
being acknowledged by the parties, the undersigned agree that they are acquiring the real
property described in the North Carolina General Warranty Deed to which this Agreement is appended as equal joint tenants, with total and complete rights of survivorship with
the effect that upon the death of either of the parties hereto, the entire interest and estate in
the subject property is granted to and shall automatically vest in the survivor. In the event
of the death of either of the parties hereto, the survivor will assume the responsibility for
the payment of the outstanding indebtedness upon any promissory note from the parties
secured by a deed of trust encumbering the property described in the deed to which this
Agreement is appended and the survivor will save the estate of the deceased party harmless
from any cause whatsoever arising out of said note and deed of trust.
Despite the contractual form, note the almost inevitable use of words of grant.
27. This concern may explain the otherwise unnecessary clause in the new statute: "[A]nd no
other document shall be necessary to establish said right of survivorship." Act of July 12, 1990, ch.
891, § 1, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws - (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1984)). The Act also includes a saving clause: "Nothing in this act shall be construed to affect the validity of instruments
that provide for a right of survivorship executed prior to the effective date of this act." Id. § 3.
28. Id. (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1984)).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

common-law presumption in favor of the joint tenancy, the method of reform
adopted in many other states.29 In other words, grants or devises to two unmarried persons in North Carolina continue to create estates lacking the right of
survivorship, unless this is "expressly" provided for.
One obvious question raised by the new statute concerns the degree of precision required in expressly providing for a right of survivorship. A carefully
drafted instrument will closely follow the words of the statute, describing the
grantees as holding "as joint tenants with right of survivorship," or even "as
joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in common." Such
wording would undoubtedly accomplish its purpose. But not all drafting is
equally careful: the right of a survivor may be referred to without expressly
using the phrase "right of survivorship." In Vettori, for example, where a right
of survivorship was found to have been created by contract, those specific words
were not used. The grantees were described only as holding "as joint tenants"
and reference was made as well to "the heirs and assigns of the survivor." Reliance must be placed on courts interpreting the statute to recognize that what
must be expressed is the intention to create the right of survivorship, not some
30
set verbal formula.
A more serious question raised by the new statute concerns the means of
creating the newly authorized joint tenancy with right of survivorship. As we
have seen, the four unities of time, title, interest, and possession were required at
common law in creating the estate. Where a grant by a third person ran in favor
of grantees as joint tenants, no problem was encountered with the unities: the
grantees took at the same time and by the same title; they held the same interest
and shared the same possession. It sometimes happened, however, that the
grantor was not a third party, but rather an owner who wished, as it were, to
share the ownership with another. Where the grantor was also named as one of
the grantees, the four essential unities failed and with them the intent to create
the joint tenancy, no matter how plainly expressed. In other words, if A conveyed to A and B "as joint tenants with right of survivorship," the resulting
estate at common law was a tenancy in common-without, of course, the right
of survivorship. This result was explained as following necessarily from the absence of at least two of the four unities: time and title. The grantees in the
hypothetical case did not take their interests at the same time or by the same
29. See, eg., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 76, § 1 (Supp. 1990):
No estate in joint tenancy in any lands, tenements or hereditaments, or in any parts thereof
or interest therein, shall be held or claimed under any grant, legacy or conveyance whatsoever heretofore or hereafter made, unless the premises therein mentioned shall expressly be
thereby declared to pass not in tenancy in common but in joint tenancy.
30. Compare the amendment to § 41-2 with § 41-2.2(b)(1) (as amended by the new statute):
A joint tenancy in shares of corporate stock or investment securities as provided by this
section shall exist when such shares or securities indicate that they are owned with the
right of survivorship, or otherwise clearly indicate an intention that upon the death of
either spouse party the interest of the decedent shall pass to the surviving spouse party.
Act of July 12, 1990, ch. 891, § 2, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws -. The argument that the failure to include
a general reference to intention in the amendment to § 41-2 implies a legislative intention in favor of
a more restrictive reading should be rejected.
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title: A's interest stemmed from the original transfer to him, while B's stemmed
from the grant in question.
In North Carolina since 1784 the four unities have not been an issue with
respect to the joint tenancy because that estate was functionally identical with
the tenancy in common. The unities were required, however, to create tenancies
by the entirety held by married persons. 3 1 Again, no problem arose from grants
by a third party to a married couple "as tenants by the entirety."'32 But a grant
by A to A and A's spouse B "as tenants by the entirety" resulted in a tenancy in
common at common law because of the absence of some of the necessary unities.
In North Carolina this result was changed by statute in 1957.33 Because the
new statute on joint tenancies does not expressly provide a solution to this ageold problem, there can be no certainty about how a court would resolve it. Possibly the common-law requirement of the four unities would be relaxed, 34 but it
seems more likely that the court would continue to require them, as it did with
respect to the tenancy by the entirety until the adoption of the corrective statute.
To avoid any risk of defeated expectations, a careful lawyer would be well advised to use the tried-and-true means of providing the necessary four unities:
conveying through a "strawman"-the usual means for creating a tenancy by
the entirety in this state prior to 1957. 35 In the hypothetical case of A seeking to
31. Tenancies by the entirety were defined by the four unities plus a "fifth unity": the unity of
person created by marriage. This is another way of saying, of course, that tenancies by the entirety
were available only to married couples.
32. There is a statutory presumption in North Carolina that a conveyance to persons who are
married to one another results in a tenancy by the entirety. The statute reads:
A conveyance of real property, or any interest therein, to a husband and wife vests
title in them as tenants by the entirety when the conveyance is to:
(1) A named man "and wife," or
(2) A named woman "and husband," or
(3) Two named persons, whether or not identified in the conveyance as husband and
wife, if at the time of conveyance they are legally married;
unless a contrary intention is expressed in the conveyance.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6(b) (1984).
33. Act of May 8, 1957, ch. 598, § 1, 1957 N.C. Sess. Laws 545 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 39-13.3(b) (1984)): "A conveyance of real property, or any interest therein, by a husband or a wife
to such husband and wife vests the same in the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety unless a
contrary intention is expressed in the conveyance." The effect of ihe statute is to suspend the need
for the missing unities not only at the creation of the estate but throughout its existence.
34. In 1956, the year before the statute dispensing with the need for the four unities to create a
tenancy by the entirety in a conveyance by one spouse to both spouses, the North Carolina Supreme
Court had upheld such a conveyance on the theory that a married couple is "an entity separate from
the individuals." Woolard v. Smith, 244 N.C. 489, 494, 94 S.E.2d 466, 469 (1956). It could be
argued that the joint tenants, too, constitute such an "entity," despite the absence of the marital
bond. The ingenuity of this argument should not conceal the fact that it would change the common
law.
A more promising argument in North Carolina might be that the joint tenancy with right of
survivorship is a new concurrent estate, not to be confused with the common-law joint tenancy,
which as we have seen was not abolished in 1784 but only shorn of its common-law incident, the
right of survivorship. As a new tenancy, the "joint tenancy with right of survivorship" might not be
subject to all the common-law technicalities.
35. See Smith v. Smith, 249 N.C. 669, 678, 107 S.E.2d 530, 536 (1959), in which the court
stated, referring to conveying through a "strawman": "MIhis is the device customarily used in
creating such an estate in land owned by one spouse, when it is desired that it be held by the
entireties."
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transfer property to A and B "as joint tenants with right of survivorship," a
preliminary conveyance to a nominee, possibly A's lawyer, with immediate reconveyance to A and B "as joint tenants with right of survivorship" would avoid

all questions concerning the four unities. The price of certainty is the cost of the
extra conveyance.
To avoid the need for conveyance through a "strawman" to create the joint
tenancy with right of survivorship in such cases, the North Carolina General
Assembly might wish to consider adopting the following statute, modeled on the
1957 statute that eliminated that otiose individual in the creation of tenancies by
the entirety:
A conveyance of real property, or any interest therein, by a person, as
grantor, to such person and one or more other persons, as grantees, as
joint tenants with right of survivorship vests the same in3 6the grantees
according to the intention expressed in the conveyance.
C. Conclusion
For the first time in more than two centuries North Carolinians are able to
create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The risk of injustice to those
whose expectations are defeated by failure to benefit at the death of a joint tenant
is minimized by the statutory requirement that the intention to create the estate
be clearly expressed. The statutory authorization of the estate permits the effectuation of intent without the need for dubious theories of contract. The power
of any joint tenant to sever the estate by conveyance is spelled out in the statute.
Although questions of interpretation of intent may arise in some cases and despite the fact that one obvious problem concerning the creation of the estate is
not resolved, foresightful practitioners have reliable means to forestall such
difficulties.

36. Again, it is hoped that the intention to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship
would be given effect even if the exact words were not used.

